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Non-technical summary 
 
A key challenge in the work of a competition authority is the investigation of various 
business conducts with respect to their effects on market competition. In case of 
horizontal mergers, the authority typically has to investigate whether potential positive 
merger effects are likely outweighed by potential anticompetitive effects (such as price 
increases) triggered by the merger. Given this work description – and having in mind the 
fundamental resource and information constraints faced by the authority – a key ingredient 
of an efficient antitrust policy is the design (and implementation) of an appropriate 
investigation framework. For the authority, such a framework allows identifying (and 
prohibiting) the potentially most harmful mergers. For the companies, such a framework 
allows important (ex ante) presumptions whether a certain merger plan has a realistic 
chance to be given the green light by the authority.   
 
Against this background, the paper develops a four-step framework to detect 
anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In the first step, an estimate of the impact of the 
merger on the market price needs to be derived. Subsequent, the second step of the 
framework has to assess whether such a predicted price increase would be sustainable post-
merger. The third step needs to assess whether the identified efficiencies are substantial 
enough to at least hold the pre-merger price level. Finally, the fourth step has to consider 
the effects of a horizontal merger on other competition variables such as product variety, 
marketing as well as R&D post-merger. 
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Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
 
Eine zentrale Herausforderung in der Arbeit einer Wettbewerbsbehörde liegt in der 
Untersuchung einer Vielzahl an unternehmerischen Verhaltensweisen in Märkten im 
Hinblick auf die dadurch ausgelösten Effekte auf den Wettbewerb. Im Falle von 
horizontalen Fusionen muss die Behörde typischerweise untersuchen, ob die positiven 
volkswirtschaftlichen Effekte eines Fusionsvorhabens nicht überragt werden von 
volkswirtschaftlich negativ einzuschätzenden Effekten wie beispielsweise Preiserhöhungen. 
Geht man von einer solchen Arbeitsbeschreibung einer Wettbewerbsbehörde aus und 
behält dabei die bestehenden Ressourcen- und Informationsknappheiten im Hinterkopf, so 
muss ein wesentlicher Bestandteil einer effizienten Wettbewerbspolitik in der Schaffung 
(und der Umsetzung) eines geeigneten Untersuchungsschemas gesehen werden. Der 
Wettbewerbsbehörde hilft die Anwendung eines solchen Schemas bei der Identifikation 
(und der anschließenden Untersagung) der volkswirtschaftlich schädlichsten Fusionen. Den 
Unternehmen erlaubt ein solches Schema eine Einschätzung darüber, ob ein bestimmtes 
Fusionsvorhaben eine realistische Chance hat, grünes Licht von der Wettbewerbsbehörde 
zu bekommen.  
 
Vor diesem Hintergrund entwickelt das Arbeitspapier ein vierstufiges 
Untersuchungsschema zur Aufdeckung von wettbewerbsfeindlichen horizontalen 
Fusionen. In der ersten Stufe muss eine Abschätzung darüber erfolgen, welche 
Auswirkungen die Fusion auf den Marktpreis haben würde. In der zweiten Stufe des 
Schemas muss sich dann detaillierter mit der Frage befasst werden, ob die im ersten Schritt 
unter abstrakten Bedingungen abgeschätzte Preiserhöhung unter den gegebenen realen 
Marktbedingungen im Falle einer Fusion tatsächlich auftreten würde. In der dritten Stufe 
muss dann der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob möglicherweise durch die Fusion 
entstehende Effizienzvorteile einen Preisanstieg nach erfolgter Fusion verhindern würden. 
In der vierten Stufe sind schließlich die möglichen Effekte der Fusion auf andere 
Wettbewerbsparameter wie beispielsweise Produktvielfalt, Marketing oder F&E genauer zu 
untersuchen.    
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1  Introduction 
The detection of anticompetitive mergers is a multidimensional problem. First and 
foremost, a horizontal merger inevitably leads to the loss of a direct competitor in a market 
and is therefore suspicious of leading to price increases. From an economic perspective, 
there are basically two strands of argument which both explain such post-merger price 
increases. On the one hand, the merged entity unilaterally might have incentives to 
decrease output and increase price given an increase in market power post-merger. 
Although the non-merging firms in the industry typically respond to such a move with an 
increase in output, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have shown that the former effect is typically 
stronger than the latter leading to an increase in price and a corresponding reduction in 
consumer surplus. On the other hand, post-merger prices may be higher than pre-merger 
prices because the firms in the post-merger market find it easier to collude tacitly or 
overtly. These effects are covered by the so-called coordinated effects analysis, which is not 
considered further below.1 In addition to the effect on price, horizontal mergers may 
influence welfare through several other channels, such as especially merger-specific 
efficiencies, product repositioning, product variety and the incentives to innovate.2 
 
2  Direct detection of anticompetitive horizontal mergers 
Given these problem specifications and having in mind the possibilities to actively detect 
cartels (by identifying asymmetric shocks or structural breaks) discussed in the recent 
literature (see Hüschelrath (2008) for an overview), the question arises whether comparable 
markers are available who can detect anticompetitive mergers. Based on the seminal work 
of Eckbo (1983), Eckbo and Wier (1985) and Stillman (1983), the event-study approach 
may provide such a possibility. The simple idea behind such a study is that a merger that 
will increase market power of the merging firms is also ‘pleasant’ for the rival firms in the 
market. If, however, the merger creates significant efficiencies and provides an incentive 
for the merged entity to lower prices post-merger, that can be considered as ‘unpleasant’ 
for the rival firms in the market. As a consequence, analysing the stock-price reactions of 
the rival firms to the announcement of a merger proposal can be helpful in distinguishing 
between mergers motivated by increases in market power (positive price reaction of rivals’ 
stocks) and mergers motivated by the realisation of efficiencies (negative price reaction of 
rivals’ stocks). The respective hypotheses are outlined in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  The theory of coordinated effects is largely based on the theory of repeated games and basically uses the 
same screens as in hard core cartel detection (see Kaplow and Shapiro, 2007: 71ff., for a short 
overview). Essentially, unilateral and coordinated effects theories aim at investigating the potentials for 
price increases post-merger. While the unilateral effects assessment basically focuses on the possibilities 
of the merged entity to increase price, the coordinated effects assessment focuses on the increased 
possibilities of all firms or a group of firms to overtly or tacitly collude post-merger, thereby increasing 
the post-merger market price.     
2  As noted by Kaplow and Shapiro (2007), a price increase can also serve as a proxy for other possible 
anticompetitive effects, such as a reduction in product quality or service or a decrease in the pace of 
innovation.  
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Table 1. Abnormal returns to the merging firms and their rivals 
 
Abnormal returns to          
merging firms 
Abnormal returns to          
rival firms 
A. Merger proposal   
Market power:                        
Collusion or Cournot 
Positive                  
(Monopoly rents) 
Positive                  
(Monopoly rents) 
Economic efficiency:              
Productivity increases 
Positive                  
(Cost savings) 
Negative                 
(Competitive disadvantage)
B. Antitrust complaint   
Market power:                        
Collusion or Cournot 
Negative                 
(Loss of monopoly rents) 
Negative                 
(Loss of monopoly rents) 
Economic efficiency:              
Productivity increases 
Negative                 
(Loss of cost savings) 
Positive                  
(Avoiding competitive 
disadvantage) 
Source: Content follows Eckbo and Wier (1985: 124) 
As shown in Table 1, in addition to focusing on rivals’ stock price reactions at the time 
of the announcement of the merger, the reactions to the announcement of an antitrust 
complaint may disclose additional evidence on the pro- or anticompetitiveness of the 
respective merger.  
Although the event-study method looks like a relatively easy way to detect 
anticompetitive mergers - and several empirical studies have shown that they can indeed be 
helpful for the detection of anticompetitive mergers - the concept has to cope with 
substantial drawbacks. First of all, the event study approach is only applicable for firms 
with publicly traded shares. This precondition may already exclude many acquisitions of 
small- and medium-sized firms from an event-study analysis.3 Furthermore, as argued by 
McAfee and Williams (1988: 199ff.), firms often derive only a small fraction of their 
revenues from the markets affected by the merger, and consequently the power of event 
studies to detect anticompetitive mergers is rather limited. A test of the event study 
approach with a known anticompetitive merger4 showed that the event study approach 
would have failed to detect that merger (see McAfee and Williams, 1988. 200ff.). Whinston 
(2006: 111) discusses ‘precedent effects’ as another potential pitfall of event studies. He 
argues that the announcement of a merger may convey information about market 
conditions more generally - such as the likelihood of further mergers as a reaction to the 
announcement of an efficiency-enhancing merger in the industry - and therefore may lead 
to “diametric” stock price reactions, such as increases in rivals’ stock prices following the 
announcement of an efficiency-enhancing merger.    
 
3  Indirect detection of anticompetitive horizontal mergers 
 
Given the substantial problems in the application of the event study approach, the 
development of an indirect but generally applicable framework to detect anticompetitive 
mergers is necessary. The following four-step approach is proposed to guide such an 
analysis:  
 
                                                          
3  A counterargument could be that these mergers are typically unproblematic from an antitrust 
perspective and consequentially do not create a need to conduct an event study anyway.  
4  McAfee and Williams (1988) use the 1979 merger of Xidex Corporation with Kalvar Corporation. Both 
firms produced non-silver duplicate microfilms. Post-merger, Xidex closed down the production facility 
of Kalvar, fired all employees and raised prices substantially for their own remaining products.  
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1. Estimation of the post-merger price increase  
2. Consideration of evidence whether such a price increase would be sustainable  
3. Estimation of the effect of possible merger efficiencies on the post-merger price 
4. Consideration of the effects of the merger on competition variables other than price 
(such as product variety or the incentives to innovate).  
 
The first step of the framework needs to develop an estimate of the impact of a horizontal 
merger on the market price(s). Such an estimate can be achieved either by applying 
econometric techniques or by applying simulation techniques based on theoretical models.  
The second step of the framework has to assess whether the price increase predicted in the 
first stage would be sustainable post-merger. As econometric and simulation tools typically 
need to abstract from important factors - such as entry or product-repositioning of existing 
rivals - these factors have to be assessed quantitatively (or at least qualitatively) with a 
conclusion whether these factors make it likely or unlikely that the merged entity would be 
able to actually impose the estimated price increase post-merger.  
The third step of the framework needs to assess, first, whether the merger efficiencies 
claimed by the merging parties are existent, merger-specific and likely to materialise post-
merger. Second, it needs to estimate whether the accepted efficiencies are strong enough at 
least hold to the pre-merger price level. 
The fourth step of the framework needs to consider the effects of a horizontal merger on 
other competition variables such as product variety, marketing and R&D post-merger, 
which might influence the overall welfare effects of a merger.  
The four-step approach will be applied next to horizontal mergers for two types of 
models: a homogenous Cournot model and a differentiated Bertrand model. Generally, 
standard Cournot models are a good approximation in homogenous good industries in 
which competition is accurately modelled by a (one-shot) quantity-setting game - or 
alternatively as a capacity-setting game with subsequent price competition (see Kreps and 
Scheinkman, 1983). If, however, a horizontal merger in a differentiated branded-products 
market has to be assessed, a differentiated Bertrand model typically delivers the better 
approximation of competitive interaction (see Kaplow and Shapiro, 2007: 59ff.).  
 
3.1  Estimation of the post-merger price increase  
The first step of the framework assesses the standard competitive concern raised by most 
horizontal mergers: their potential to increase prices post-merger. Based on a specification 
of pre-merger market conditions and assumptions on the behaviour of firms in the market, 
economic models can be applied to estimate post-merger price increases (see Epstein and 
Rubinfeld, 2001: 886ff., for a detailed description).  
Starting with an assessment in a homogenous market in which market interaction is best 
described by quantity competition, Dansby and Willig (1979) derive the following simple 
relationship between the Lerner index of market power and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index:   
 
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2
. (1)
Equation (1) shows that the Lerner index for an industry is given by its HHI divided by 
the market demand elasticity. Market power is increasing with the concentration in a 
market and decreasing with the market demand elasticity. In order to receive a simple, 
back-of-the-envelope estimate of the price increase following a horizontal merger, 
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Equation (1) can be rearranged to receive the following expression for the price increase 
following a horizontal merger (see Annex 7.1 for the proof): 
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As shown by Equation (2), the percentage price increase following a merger is given by 
the change in the HHI divided by the market demand elasticity minus the HHI in the post-
merger state. Alternatively, Equation (2) can be expressed in market shares 
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(3)
with s1 and s2 indicating the market shares of the merging companies. Figure 1 plots 
Equation (2) based on unity market demand elasticity.   
 
Fig. 1. Percentage price increase due to a merger in a homogenous Cournot model 
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Figure 1 shows the percentage price increase post-merger for various combinations of 
post-merger HHI and the merger-induced change of the HHI. For example, a post-merger 
HHI of 3000 and a corresponding change in the HHI of 450 would forecast a price 
increase between 5,00%-7,50% (the exact value is 6,43%). However, for a demand elasticity 
of 1,5, the predicted price increase would drop to 3,75%. This example already indicates 
the sensitivity of the results with respect to the underlying market demand elasticity, which 
will be studied further below.  
Furthermore, as assessed in more detail in Nelson and Sun (2001: 935ff.), Equation (2) 
and the corresponding Figure 1 are based on several assumptions which might become 
critical in the sense that they are not met in the market being investigated. Apart from 
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obvious assumptions such as (1) quantity competition or (2) the presence of homogenous 
goods, other less obvious but nevertheless potentially critical assumptions include that (3) 
all firms are assumed to have constant marginal costs, (4) the merger does not change the 
cost structure of the firm, (5) the merger does not change the behaviour of the firms, (6) 
the post-merger market share of the firms is equal to the sum of their pre-merger market 
shares, (7) the elasticity of demand is constant over the relevant range of sales levels and (8) 
there is no entry. Werden and Froeb (2007: 7) consider assumptions (3) and (6) as 
especially critical, which reduces the significance of price-increase estimates derived by the 
above formula. Merger simulations - as sketched below for a differentiated products market 
- can typically help to relax at least some of the critical assumptions of simple, back-of-the-
envelope formulas.     
In a world of differentiated branded products, a Bertrand model is typically an 
appropriate approximation of competitive interaction. In general, product differentiation 
lessens competition, as an increase in price by one firm does not immediately lead to the 
loss of all customers for that firm.5 The basic reason for this finding - first reflected in the 
theory of monopolistic competition by Chamberlin (1933) as well as the theory of 
imperfect competition by Robinson (1933) - is that products are not perfect substitutes for 
each other any more, with the direct effect that a fraction of customers would still buy the 
product in the event of a price increase. The first chart in Figure 2 below explains this 
fundamental characteristic of differentiated product markets.6 
Figure 2 shows four products (A, B, C and D) which are located at different places 
among a line representing consumer preferences. In the initial stage, it is assumed that the 
prices for all products are the same. The substitutability between different products (from 
the consumer perspective) is expressed by the slope of the umbrellas originating in the 
respective basis product prices. Given this set-up, Chart 1 in Figure 2 shows the 
consequences of a price rise of firm C from Pc to Pc'. Although company C would loose all 
customers located in the areas cd-c'd and bc-bc' to products D and B, it would still keep 
the customers between c'd and bc'. Dependent on the exact market specifics, company C 
will trade off the margin increase of the remaining customers with the loss in customers to 
decide whether a price increase is profitable or not.7  
Now imagine that the producers of products B and C in Figure 2 consider merging. In 
such a case, the second chart in Figure 2 shows that it becomes - ceteris paribus - more 
likely that the price increase for products B and C (the merged entity) is profitable, as the 
customers switching from product B to product C are not lost for the merged entity but 
just have to pay the higher price (see Willig, 1991, for a detailed assessment). In other 
words, an evaluation of mergers in differentiated product markets needs to assess not only 
how many customers a firm would loose following a price rise but also whom these 
customers switch to. The so-called diversion ratio satisfies this demand.    
 
                                                          
5  While horizontal differentiation leads to different features of products (valued by the consumers), 
vertical differentiation relates to differences in quality levels (of the same features).  
6  Inspired by comparable graphs in Bishop and Walker (2002: 71) and Baker and Bresnahan (1985: 429). 
Although the aim of Figure 2 is purely presentational, without having in mind any specific model, the 
general set-up is equal to a typical Hotelling location model with Bertrand competition. D’Aspremont et 
al. (1979) show that as long as the (two) firms can change their prices and location costless, no 
equilibrium exists in such a model. However, modifications of the model can prove the existence of an 
equilibrium (see Carton and Perloff, 2000: 217ff.). 
7  Although Figure 2 assumes that the horizontal 0-1 line represents the spectrum of customer 
preferences, it is also possible to interpret the horizontal 0-1 line in a spatial sense. The umbrellas would 
then mirror the transportation costs, which determine the intensity of competition between different 
locations. In other words, the graph can refer to both types of differentiated products: branded 
consumer products and physical facilities that distribute goods where differentiation is based on 
location, such as supermarkets or hospitals (see Shapiro, 1995: 2f.).  
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Fig. 2. Competition between horizontally differentiated products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diversion ratio is a measure of how close two products are in the product space and 
therefore how intense competition is between these two products. Shapiro (1996) defines 
the diversion ratio as “the fraction of sales lost by brand [C] that are captured by brand B 
in case the price for brand [C] is increased by a certain percentage rate.”8 Table 2 explains 
the concept in a hypothetical four-product market.  
Table 2. Calculating diversion ratios 
 Initial Sales 
(volume) 
Sales after 5% 
price rise of C 
Diversion in 
volume 
Diversion ratio
Brand A 5000 5000 0 0,0 
Brand B 3500 3900 400 0,4 
Brand C 2000 1000 -1000  
Brand D 1000 1600 600 0,6 
Total 11500 11500 0 1,0 
As shown in Table 2, it is assumed that the price for product C is raised by 5%, which 
leads to a reduction in its sales of 50% (i.e., 1000 units). Then 600 units of the 1000 units in 
sales switch to product D, while the remaining 400 units switch to product B, leading to 
diversion ratios of 0,6 for products C and D and 0,4 for products C and B. Product A does 
                                                          
8  Technically, the diversion ratio from A to B is the ratio of the cross-price elasticity of demand for A 
with respect to the price of B over the own elasticity of demand for A. In a logit model, the market 
diversion ratio between products 1 and 2 is given by the market share of product 2 divided by 1 minus 
the market share of product 1.  
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not gain any additional sales from the price increase of product C, leading to a diversion 
ratio of 0,0 between product C and A. If, however, products B and C belong to one firm, a 
price increase in product B lead to a loss of some customers to product A, but the loss to 
product C stays within the firm. Hence the loss of revenue is less and price rises are more 
likely to be profitable. As a consequence, firms which control a larger product portfolio 
(i.e., have a high market share) will charge higher prices than firms with a smaller product 
portfolio.  
A very helpful characteristic of diversion ratios is that they can be incorporated into a 
differentiated Bertrand model to derive an estimate of the post-merger price increase in a 
differentiated products industry. As shown in Annex 7.2, if the demand function is linear, 
the percentage price increase triggered by the merger can be derived by the following 
expression: 
 
 D
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MergereMergerPost
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
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12Pr
Pr
. (4)
Equation (4) basically shows that the post-merger price increase is a function of the pre-
merger price-cost margin as well as the diversion ratio between the two brands merging. 
Generally, higher margins result from greater product differentiation, while a higher 
diversion ratio, as explained above, reflects more intense competition between the products 
(see Werden, 1996). Plotting Equation (4) for various combinations of pre-merger price-
cost margin and diversion ratios leads to Figure 3.  
 
Fig. 3. Percentage post-merger price increases against pre-merger price-cost margin and 
diversion ratio  
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As shown in Figure 3, for diversion ratios below 0,2, the percentage price increase post-
merger is estimated to be below 10% (the exact value for M=0,4 and D=0,2, e.g., is 
5,00%). Generally, the percentage price increase post-merger rises with the pre-merger 
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price-cost margin and the diversion ratio. This is in line with the general interpretation of 
the diversion ratio provided above.  
However, it is important to remark that Equation (4) is only valid as long as the two 
merging firms are identical before the merger, they both produce a single product pre-
merger and both face a linear demand curve. As argued by Bishop and Walker (2002: 374), 
all three assumptions can be critical, leading to wrong conclusions if Equation (4) is just 
applied mechanically without studying the suitability of the underlying assumptions up 
front. As shown in Annex 7.2, if the demand curve is assumed to be iso-elastic instead of 
linear, Equation (4) changes to    
 
 DM
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 (5)
leading to significant changes in the price predictions as well as the range of economically 
interpretable results.9 Furthermore, if the assumption of symmetric firms is released, then 
the respective equation to estimate the price increase loses some of its ‘applicability 
charme’ (see Bishop and Walker, 2002: 378f.). 
On a more general level, Hausman and Leonard (1997) fundamentally criticise the use of 
such back-of-the-envelope formulas. Following the ‘some–number-is-better-than-no-
number’ fallacy discussed in Diamond and Hausman (1994), they argue that it would be 
preferable to rely entirely on qualitative analysis - in case the data (and/or time) for a 
sophisticated estimation of a demand model (see Hausman et al., 1994, for an overview) is 
not available - rather than applying simple simulation techniques such as diversion ratio 
analysis. Werden (2004b: 4), however, takes the counterargument by remarking that “price-
increase predictions are only rough estimates, but that is better than none at all”.   
In line with the reasoning in Werden (2004b), diversion ratios and corresponding 
estimates of post-merger price increases can provide useful back-of-the-envelope results 
for differentiated product mergers in which a) market interaction is adequately described by 
Bertrand competition, b) the mentioned assumptions are met to an acceptable degree, and 
c) the existing data and the budget or skills in the antitrust authority do not allow a more 
sophisticated analysis, such as the estimation of demand systems10 (see Hausman et al., 
1994, for an overview). In any case, such simple simulation results - as well as the results of 
more sophisticated techniques - should be viewed as one piece of evidence and should by 
no means replace a qualitative assessment of the case based on documents, interviews with 
customers and institutional details.11 
As an alternative to the application of back-of-the-envelope formulas, economists have 
developed more sophisticated ‘merger simulation tools’ to come to conclusions on the 
likely effects of a horizontal merger on market price (see Werden and Froeb, 2007: 31ff. 
and ABA, 2005: 269ff. for more detailed overviews). In general, these tools use a model of 
consumer demand and a model of competitive interaction to predict the price effects of a 
merger (see Hausman and Leonard, 1997). In order to be able to apply such tools, market 
information, such as market shares and market demand elasticities, needs to be estimated as 
data input for the simulation of the effect of a merger-induced change in the ownership 
structure on market price.  
                                                          
9  As (1-M-D)>0, D must be larger than (1-M) to deliver interpretable economic results (which delineates 
a relatively small range of sensible price predictions).  
10  Scanner data from supermarkets is an example of ‘good data’ which technically allows the application of 
more sophisticated approaches. However, time limitations or missing skills in the technicalities of such 
forms of analysis may hinder its application on the side of the antitrust authority.  
11  Although merger simulation focuses on a quantification of the unilateral effects of a merger, Davis 
(2006) provides an application focusing on coordinated effects.  
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An especially helpful feature of merger simulation tools is that they allow simulating not 
only the post-merger prices but can also take account of changes in the cost structure (the 
so-called merger efficiencies) and antitrust-induced changes in the ownership structure (the 
so-called structural merger remedies). However, despite an increasing adoption of merger 
simulation tools in antitrust authorities and economic consultancies, the general suitability 
of such techniques is questioned by academics and practioners. Walker (2005: 27), for 
example, remarks that “merger simulation models do not allow investigators to avoid much 
of the competitive effects analysis relating to the relevant economic market, nor do they 
necessarily provide more precision to merger control.” He adds that problems are 
predestined if ‘off-the-shelf models’ are applied for a certain case rather than ‘bespoke 
models’, which take account of relevant specifics of the market and industry at hand.12 
Werden and Froeb (2007: 58) show, with data collected for a competitive effects 
assessment of the WorldCom-Sprint merger in the United States, that the estimated price 
increases post-merger heavily depend on the underlying demand form. With linear demand, 
the merger simulation led to a price increase of 2,3%, while an iso-elastic demand would 
lead to an estimate of 16,4%. However, in case of AIDS, an estimate of 13,8% was 
obtained. This simple practical example underpins the general sensitivity of these models 
and the importance of getting the model input (such as the demand form) right in order to 
receive meaningful estimates of the post-merger price increase. This caveat is confirmed by 
Whinston (2006: 101f.), who identifies the following important caveats of merger 
simulation: 1.) The quality of the predictions depends on the correct estimation of demand; 
2.) The choice of the post-merger behavioural model of the industry is key, as firm’s may 
change their behaviour as a result of the merger; and 3.) Pricing is only one of several 
important competition variables such as entry or R&D, and merger simulation tools so far 
have failed to include them.  
Given the potential problems of merger simulations, Carlton (2003a: 7ff.) views these 
tools as a useful substitute for the more direct ‘traditional’ approaches for merger analysis, 
which basically build on ‘natural experiments’ aiming at answering the question “What 
happens to price when the number of competitors diminishes by one?” Carlton (2003a: 11) 
himself provides an example of such a natural experiment: “[S]uppose that there are 5 
firms in most areas of the country, but only 4 in one area. Well, the difference in price 
between the two areas may be a good predictor of the effect of a merger if the regions are 
otherwise similar. By identifying such ‘natural experiments’, one can try to assess the effect 
on price of having one less firm. This type of analysis is called ‘reduced’ form analysis, in 
contrast to structural [such as merger simulation] because unlike structural analysis, the 
reason for the observed relationship between price and number of firms (e.g., the presence 
of demand substitutes) is not spelled out.” Generally, the evidence created by such natural 
experiments is extensively used by economic consultancies in their merger assessments. 
 
 
3.2   Consideration of evidence whether such a price increase would be 
sustainable  
The second step of the detection framework for anticompetitive mergers is entered by 
cases which are suspicious of significantly increasing market prices post-merger. As 
                                                          
12  Slade (2006: 21) also criticises simple merger simulation tools because “the predictions about markups 
and merger effects that can be obtained from simple models are often very misleading. Unfortunately, 
however, a number of economists have attempted to convince competition authorities that user-friendly 
canned programs can provide reasonable predictions.” However, later on, Slade agrees that back-of-the-
envelope calculations can be useful “as long as everyone understands the assumptions that underlie 
those calculations and no spurious claims of accuracy are made … However, we should eschew generic, 
one-size-fits-all merger models and numbers that come out of black boxes” (Slade, 2006: 23).                                                    
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simulation tools typically abstract from important factors - such as the potential role of 
entry or product repositioning of existing competitors - these factors have to be assessed 
qualitatively and have to be incorporated into a conclusion whether the estimated price 
increase would actually materialise in the post-merger world.13  
A second focus of an assessment on the sustainability of a simulated price increase could 
be buyer power. In general, the existence of a significant countervailing power of 
customers typically reduces the ability of the merging parties to increase price post-merger. 
“Empirical studies have shown that the stronger and more concentrated the buyers’ side of 
the market is, the less is any ability of sellers to elevate their prices”14 (ABA, 2005: 29). One 
central explanation for this finding is that collusion becomes harder to sustain because, on 
the one hand, deviation incentives are larger and, on the other hand, the buyers typically 
have incentives to monitor the transactions closely and are typically in a good position to 
question price increases (or might even use competitive bidding procedures to promote 
competition). Furthermore, large buyers often also have the possibility to sponsor entry 
into the supplier’s market in order to increase competitive pressures (see ABA, 2005: 29).   
A central focus of such an investigation lies on the role of entry barriers in the respective 
market, because even in the case that a merger simulation predicts a significant price 
increase post-merger, low-entry barriers in the respective market would likely make such a 
price increase unsustainable. Following the theory of contestable markets, even a 
monopolist has no choice other than to price at marginal cost if ‘hit-and-run’ entrants are 
waiting to enter the market as soon as it raises the price above competitive levels.  
Even if market concentration is relatively high, incumbents may be unable to exercise 
market power (i.e., earning monopoly profits) as long as potential entrants could easily and 
quickly start producing substitutes. Consequently, an analysis of the likelihood, timeliness 
and sufficiency of entry following a price increase is a key component in assessing market 
power (see Waterson, 1981; Coate and Langenfeld, 1993; McAfee et al., 2004, for surveys). 
Furthermore, the analysis of (potential) entry usually plays an important role in the 
subsequent assessments of competitive effects of certain suspicious conducts as well as in 
the design of remedies.    
The likelihood of entry is determined by the profitability and possibility of entry. The 
profitability of entry can be operationalised by estimating the expected net present value of the 
post-entry profits as well as the sunk costs of entry.15 If the discounted profits are larger 
than the sunk costs of entry, then entry would be profitable; otherwise it would not be (see 
e.g., Ross (2004) for a formal treatment). Whether entry would actually take place, however, 
does not only depend on the profitability of entry but also on the possibility of entry. The 
possibility of entry is determined by barriers to entry existing in the market. The consequential 
key question of ‘what is understood by barriers to entry’ has been assessed by many 
economists, however, without reaching an agreement on an overarching concept of barriers 
to entry.  
The first influential concept of barriers to entry was developed by Bain (1956: 3). He 
defines the term commonly as “an advantage of established sellers in an industry over 
potential entrant sellers, which is reflected in the extent to which established sellers can 
persistently raise their price above competitive levels without attracting new firms to enter 
                                                          
13  Following ICN (2006: 41ff.), factors which help to understand the competitive constraints existent in 
the market include low barriers to entry or expansion, buyer power, the nature of competition in the 
market, responsiveness of competitors, existence of alternative suppliers or the elimination of a 
potential competitor.  
14  See Scherer and Ross (1990: 533ff.) and Schumacher (1991) for supporting empirical evidence of the 
seller market power-reducing effect of countervailing buying power.  
15  Sunk costs of entry are generally defined as costs which must be incurred to enter a market but which are not 
recoverable upon exiting the market. 
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the industry”.16 Stigler (1968) prefers a narrower definition. He proposes to think of a 
barrier to entry as “a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) … which must be 
borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the 
industry”. Fisher (1979: 23), however, bases his proposal on social welfare when he argues 
that “[a] barrier to entry exists when entry would be socially beneficial but is somehow 
prevented … The social benefit-cost calculation is not correctly reflected in the private 
benefit-cost calculation of the potential entrant”.  
Without wanting to enter into an in-depth discussion of the exact implications of the 
different definitions (see Waterson, 1981; McAfee et al., 2004), it is apparent that Bain’s 
concept considers all factors as barriers to entry which increase an entrant’s costs of 
producing and selling (or which reduce its revenues), while Stigler is only interested in 
factors that raise an entrant’s costs relative to those experienced by the incumbent firms 
(see ABA, 2005: 122). As a consequence, while the Bainian definition considers scale 
economies, product differentiation, absolute cost advantages and capital requirements as 
classical entry barriers, the Stiglerian definition typically does not. Under the latter, scale 
economies are not an entry barrier as long as entrants and incumbents have equal access to 
the respective production technologies.17 
Inspired by the significant differences in the application of these definitions, McAfee et 
al. (2004) proposed a new taxonomy of barriers to entry. The authors argue that the 
classical concepts à la Bain, Stigler and others typically aim at studying industry competition 
in the long run. Antitrust policy makers and consumers are more concerned, however, 
about the effects in the medium and the short run (see McAfee and Mialon, 2004: 6). 
McAfee et al. (2004) thus propose to differentiate between economic barriers to entry and 
antitrust barriers to entry. Economic barriers to entry are defined narrowly in Stiglerian 
terms, while an antitrust barrier to entry is defined as “a cost that delays entry, and thereby 
reduces social welfare relative to immediate but equally costly entry” (McAfee and Mialon, 
2004: 4). Based on this definition, the authors argue that economies of scale could be an 
antitrust barrier to entry (albeit no economic barrier to entry) because they can delay entry 
and therefore can reduce social welfare (see McAfee et al., 2004: 464).   
The question of how to measure entry barriers in practical antitrust policy was 
investigated in depth by NERA (2004: 10ff.), who proposes to measure the following entry 
barrier indicators:  
 Advertising ratio to sales - aims at capturing the level of advertising which a potential 
entrant must pay to enter the market, 
 R&D expenditure ratio to sales - aims at capturing the level of R&D expenditure a potential 
entrant must invest to enter and compete in the market, 
 Minimum efficient scale - aims at capturing how large a production facility has to be in order 
to be able to compete on price with the incumbent firms, 
                                                          
16  See McAfee et al. (2004) for a discussion of different definitions of barriers to entry. The sources of Bainian 
barriers to entry are diverse and reach from legal entry barriers (such as entry regulation by the state) to several 
forms of private entry barriers. Private entry barriers are typically subdivided into structural and strategic 
barriers to entry. Structural barriers to entry are related to structural or technical characteristics of an industry 
(e.g., economies of scale, absolute cost advantages such as favourable access to raw materials or a favourable 
geographic location, capital cost requirements, product differentiation advantages, etc.). Strategic barriers to 
entry are largely based on the notion of strategic entry deterrence, realising that existing firms might 
deliberately behave in ways that decrease the probability of entry of other firms (see Waldman and Jensen, 
2000: 129, and chapter 3 below). 
17  As commented by von Weizsäcker (2004), the determination of a suitable definition of barrier to entry 
crucially depends on the underlying concept of competition. Viewed from that angle, the differences in the 
definitions between Bain - belonging to the Harvard school and influenced by the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm - and Stigler - belonging to the Chicago school of antitrust analysis - should not be too 
surprising, as they are driven by the fundamentally different concepts of competition.  
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 Excess industry capacity - aims at capturing the possibility of incumbents to flood the 
market in the event of entry, 
 Firm entry/exit rates - aims at capturing the fact that the presence of sunk costs deters 
entry and postpones exit, 
 Ratio of capital expenditure to sales - aims at capturing the fact that the greater the capital 
investment that must be financed for any return, the higher will be the hurdle of raising 
finance, 
 Regulatory/Licence restrictions - aims at capturing the fact that new entrants may be barred 
from entering a market by virtue of government regulation. 
 The NERA report quantifies these ratios for various industries in the United Kingdom, 
affording a decent picture of the ‘ease of entry’ in these industries. However, the list should 
be considered only as a starting point for developing ‘bespoke’ indicators covering the 
specifics of the industry of interest.18 
In addition to assessing the likelihood of entry, the timeliness of entry criterion examines 
“whether entry would be sufficiently swift and sustained to deter or defeat the exercise of 
market power” (EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section VI, No. 74). Typically, entry is 
considered timely if it could occur within two years (from initial planning to significant 
market impact). However, the time period considered appropriate depends on the 
characteristics and dynamics of the market as well as on the specific capabilities of the 
potential entrants (see Oxera, 2006). The analysis of the frequency and successfulness of 
historical entry episodes in the respective industries may help to assess whether ‘timely 
entry’ is likely to be expected (see ABA, 2005: 137ff.).     
Finally, the sufficiency of entry criterion demands that entry must be of sufficient scope and 
magnitude to restrict the exercise of market power. Following the EU Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (Section VI; No.75), even rapid and profitable entry might not be sufficient to 
defeat competitive concerns if entry is, for instance, small-scale and takes place into a 
market niche. Oxera (2006) proposes to concentrate an assessment of the sufficiency of 
entry on the general strength of potential entrants, in particular their ability to constrain 
incumbents’ prices.   
 
3.3   Estimation of the effect of possible merger efficiencies on the post-merger 
price 
The third step in the detection approach for anticompetitive horizontal mergers considers 
merger efficiencies. Generally speaking, merger-specific efficiencies are of interest because 
they have the potential to offset the merged firms’ incentives to increase price post-merger. 
In other words, even if the first two stages of the detection framework come to the 
conclusion that the merged entity would have the incentive and the possibility to increase 
price, the existence of merger-specific efficiencies could offset this increase or could even 
incentivise the merged entity to increase production post-merger.  
The follow-up question of what degree of merger efficiencies is sufficient to restore pre-
merger prices can again be estimated by rather simple formulas. In a homogenous Cournot 
world, the sufficient percentage cost reduction to restore pre-merger prices, c , can be 
expressed as a function of the merging firms’ market shares and the market demand 
elasticity (see Annex 7.3 for the proof): 
                                                          
18  The empirical literature has developed so-called ‘indices of entry barriers’ (see, e.g., Orr, 1974), which include 
other indicators such as risk (measured as the standard deviation of industry profit rates), past rate of growth in 
the industry and past profit growth in the industry.  
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with sj and sk representing the output-based market shares of the two merging firms.19 
Plotting Equation (7) for the purpose of an easier interpretation leads to Figure 4 below. 
  
Fig. 4. Sufficient percentage cost reduction to restore pre-merger prices in a homogenous 
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As shown in Figure 4, the sufficient percentage cost reduction rises with the market 
shares of the two merging firms. In general, even mergers between firms with relatively low 
market shares have to realise substantial efficiencies in order to restore pre-merger prices. 
For example, if both firms have a market share of 10%, the respective sufficient cost 
reduction would be in a range between 10,00% and 20,00% (the exact value is 11,11%).  
However, it has to be kept in mind that Figure 5 is based on unity market demand 
elasticity. The sensitivity of the sufficient percentage cost reduction with respect to the 
market demand elasticity is clarified by Table 3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19  In case of symmetric market shares, sj=sk=s, (24) above simplifies to  
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Table 3. Percentage marginal cost reduction that restores pre-merger price dependent on 
the change in HHI and demand elasticity 
Market shares of merging 
firms `Delta` Elasticity 
sj sk ΔHHI 1 2 3 
0,05 0,05 50 5,26% 2,56% 1,69% 
0,05 0,1 100 7,27% 3,48% 2,29% 
0,1 0,1 200 11,11% 5,26% 3,45% 
0,1 0,15 300 13,79% 6,42% 4,18% 
0,15 0,15 450 17,65% 8,11% 5,26% 
0,2 0,2 800 25,00% 11,11% 7,14% 
0,3 0,3 1800 42,86% 17,65% 11,11% 
0,35 0,3 2100 48,00% 19,31% 12,09% 
0,4 0,4 3200 66,67% 25,00% 15,38% 
0,5 0,5 5000 100,00% 33,33% 20,00% 
Source: Inspired by a comparable table in Froeb and Werden (1998: 269) 
As shown in Table 3, estimating the correct market demand elasticity is crucial with 
respect to the choice of the appropriate marginal cost reduction. A merger between two 
firms with a 10% pre-merger market share would demand a percentage marginal cost 
reduction of 11,11% for a demand elasticity of 1, but only a reduction of 5,26% if the 
demand elasticity is 2. Table 3 further shows the respective change in the HHI (or ‘delta’) 
value, which can be calculated by doubling the product of the market shares of the two 
merging companies and multiplying in with 10.000. For example, a merger which leads to a 
delta of 50 needs to realise a marginal cost reduction of 5,26% (if unity elasticity is 
assumed) in order to restore pre-merger prices. 
For the case of a differentiated Bertrand model, it is also possible to derive the 
complementary back-of-the-envelope formula to estimate the sufficient percentage cost 
reduction which restores pre-merger prices (see Annex 7.4 for the proof):   
  jiiji ijjijjiijii DDM
ppDMDDM
c 

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/
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For the symmetric case, MMM ji   and DDD ji  , Equation (8) simplifies to20 
D
D
M
Mc  11 . (9)
As shown by Equation (9), estimates of the pre-merger price-cost margin and the 
diversion ratio are enough to receive an estimate of the sufficient percentage cost 
reduction. Plotting Equation (9) for the purpose of an easier interpretation leads to Figure 
5 below. 
As reflected in Figure 5 and also stressed by Werden (1996), if the products are relatively 
differentiated (i.e., M is high) and the merging firms compete intensively (i.e., D is high), 
large cost reductions are necessary to restore pre-merger prices. As shown in Figure 5, if 
the pre-merger price-cost margin is 0,45 and the diversion ratio is 0,3, the sufficient 
percentage cost reduction lies between 30,00% and 40,00% (the exact value is 35,06%).   
 
 
                                                          
20  As shown by Werden and Froeb (2007: 15), Equation (9) can also be expressed as a proportion of pre-
merger price leading to MD/(1-D).  
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Fig. 5. Sufficient percentage cost reduction to restore pre-merger prices in a differentiated 
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Although the calculation of sufficient percentage cost reductions can be a helpful 
quantitative tool in assessing merger efficiencies, it masks several important conceptual 
challenges of merger efficiencies. One general aspect refers to the fact that merger 
efficiencies do not necessarily have to cause a measurable reduction in marginal cost as it 
was assumed so far. In practice, merger efficiencies can take many forms, and it is with the 
antitrust authority to decide which efficiencies are accepted and which are not. Ivaldi et al. 
(2003: 63), for instance, differentiate between efficiencies generated by a better exploitation 
of tangible assets (such as rationalisation through the reallocation of the production, 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope or investment) and those by a better 
exploitation of intangible assets (such as sharing of know-how, management, R&D and 
innovation, product-line redefinition or purchasing power).21 
Given this enumeration, it is straightforward to see that some efficiencies may translate 
directly into marginal cost reductions (e.g., economies of scale) while others rather lead to a 
reduction in fixed costs (e.g., R&D expenditures). The question whether only the former or 
both types of efficiencies are considered within a merger efficiencies assessment finally 
depends on the underlying welfare approach followed by the respective antitrust 
authority.22 Additionally, the mentioned efficiencies differ with respect to the time window 
                                                          
21  Evans and Padilla (2003) point out that every merger efficiencies assessment has to consider supply-side 
efficiencies (referring to the cheaper production of existing products) and demand-side efficiencies 
(referring to new or better products, such as increased network size or product quality), both which may 
be realised by a horizontal merger. Kolaski and Dick (2002) provide a taxonomy of possible efficiencies 
based on the traditional differentiation between allocative efficiencies, productive efficiencies, dynamic 
efficiencies and transactional efficiencies. As assessed in more detail in Röller et al. (2001: 42ff.), several 
alternative typologies exist. Röller et al. (2001) differentiate between a typology based on the concept of 
the production function (rationalisation, economies of scale, technological progress, purchasing 
economies and slack) and one based on the alternate distinctions of real cost savings vs. redistributive 
(or pecuniary) cost savings, fixed costs vs. variable costs, firm-level efficiencies vs. industry-level 
efficiencies and, finally, efficiencies in the relevant market vs. efficiencies in other markets.  
22  In general, microeconomic theory suggests that marginal cost savings have a direct influence on short-
term pricing behaviour, while fixed cost savings don’t have this influence and would therefore not be 
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in which they are scheduled to materialise. For example, while a re-allocation of production 
can be accomplished fairly quickly, efficiencies in R&D might only materialise in the 
medium or long term by, for instance, improving new product development.  
In principle, it is possible to weight all these pro- and anticompetitive aspects by a simple 
calculation of the net present value of the likely benefits and harms of a proposed merger. 
Simons (2004), for instance, takes a potential merger of two widget producers and assumes 
that the market investigations of the antitrust authority have revealed the following: the 
market is widgets with a 80% probability; entry will not occur for 2 years with a 80% 
probability; the anticompetitive effect of the merger is a 10% price rise for 2 years with a 
80% probability; marginal cost will decline and impact price by 2% with 70% probability 
beginning in year 2 and continuing though year 5; pecuniary costs will decline and impact 
price by 1% with 70% probability beginning in year and continuing through year 5; and 
fixed costs will decline and impact price by 1% with 70% probability beginning in year 3 
through year 5. Based on these assumptions, it is possible to calculate the net present value 
resulting from the proposed merger. This schedule is shown in Table 4 below.   
Table 4. Calculating the consumer welfare net present value 
Years 
 
Proba-
bility 
Harm or 
Benefit 
Risk 
adjust- 
Ment 1 2 3 4 5 
Competitive effects         
Market definition 0,8        
Entry 0,8        
Anticompetitive effects 0,8 -10,0       
Total 0,51 -10,0 -5,1 -5,1 -5,1 0 0 0 
Efficiencies         
Marginal cost 0,7 2,0 1,4 0 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 
Pecuniary benefits 0,7 1,0 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 
Fixed cost benefit 0,7 2,0 1,4 0 0 1,4 1,4 1,4 
Total effect    -4,4 -3,0 3,5 3,5 3,5 
Net present value @ 10% 
rate 
0,71 
       
Source: Content follows Simons (2004: 3) 
As shown in the simple spreadsheet calculation above, although the hypothetical merger 
causes a price increase of 10% for two years, the net effect of the merger on consumer 
welfare is positive. It further shows that efficiencies realised years after the completion of 
the merger can contribute substantially to the procompetitive effects of a merger. 
Against this background, the major problem for an antitrust authority with respect to 
merger efficiencies is to check their plausibility, their likelihood of realisation and their 
likely effects on post-merger competition. 23  From a microeconomic perspective, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
considered as efficiencies. However, as virtually all fixed costs become variable by simply increasing the 
time horizon, this distinction is often not easy to make in terms of efficiencies (see also Carlton, 2007, 
who argues that many fixed costs are recurring and respective savings can therefore very well translate 
into lower future costs - which eventually benefit consumers through lower prices). Furthermore, a total 
welfare standard would still allow taking account of fixed cost savings. Additionally, as remarked by 
Everett and Ross (2002: 20ff), the often assumed equality of a price standard and a consumer welfare 
standard is not correct from a theoretical point of view. While a pure price standard would just 
concentrate on the post-merger price, a consumer welfare standard would also consider non-price 
influences of the merger such as effects on product choice or product quality.  
23  Ivaldi et al. (2003: 64f.) consider ex post reviews of efficiency gains as a way to secure them for the 
consumers. Although theoretically appealing, they conclude that it seems illusory to believe that such 
interventions could be a realistic option for antitrust policy. Davies et al. (2007: IX) report that firms 
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straightforward to identify substantial informational advantages on the side of the merging 
firms about the existence and size of merger remedies. Amir et al. (2004) manage to show 
in a Cournot oligopoly context that firms have an incentive to ‘overestimate’ the 
efficiencies achieved by the merger with respect to both the antitrust authority (in order to 
get the merger through) and rivals (in order to influence their beliefs on the 
competitiveness of the new merged entity). They therefore conclude that antitrust 
authorities should be reluctant to accept cost-reducing arguments, as there is a high 
probability that the estimated efficiencies are smaller or even non-existent, leading to 
higher prices in the post-merger world. The results of the majority of empirical studies - 
which tend to show a very moderate successfulness of horizontal mergers - would also 
(indirectly) support such an argument. As a consequence, antitrust scholars such as Farrell 
and Katz (2006) have argued that it may be optimal to follow a pure consumer welfare 
approach in merger control as some kind of counterweight to the firm’s informational 
advantages and to possible lobbying activities during the merger control procedure (see 
Neven and Röller, 2006). Kaplow and Shapiro (2007: 89) add a dynamic perspective, 
remarking that “if the process of competition itself … is of some value, but this value is 
difficult to measure, it makes sense to tilt the balance against concentration. This might be 
done by making the threshold for challenge lower … or through other means, such as 
being less generous in considering efficiencies in justifying otherwise problematic mergers”.       
The question of an appropriate standard for ‘acceptable’ merger efficiencies is - among 
others - assessed by Farrell and Shapiro (2001). Having in mind their own theoretical 
finding that not just a reallocation of production but real merger synergies - that is, the 
integration of specific and hard-to-trade assets which create output/cost configurations 
which would not be feasible otherwise - are necessary 24  to avoid welfare-reducing 
horizontal mergers, they propose a simple, three-step decision tree to extract merger-
specific synergies. The first stage of the framework investigates whether the merged entity 
would likely achieve the claimed efficiencies. Given the fact that every merger purports to 
be motivated by substantial efficiencies, an antitrust investigation has to assess whether 
such calculations are sound and plausible. If this is found to be the case, the second step 
asks whether the merging firms would likely achieve the efficiencies unilaterally. This 
question tries to find out whether the efficiencies are merger-specific or not. If this is 
found to be the case, it is asked in a third step whether the efficiencies could be achieved 
unilaterally. Only if such a question is denied, then the merger-specific efficiencies are 
synergies and therefore relevant for an antitrust assessment following the Farrell-Shapiro 
approach. 25  Applying the framework would, for instance, allow the conclusion that 
economies of scale are typically not accepted as synergies, because they can be achieved 
unilaterally by ‘simply’ extending the production capacities26 (see Farrell and Shapiro, 2001, 
for a discussion of additional implications).      
                                                                                                                                                                          
have actually tried in merger control cases to get the merger through by signing a guarantee that prices 
will be reduced post-merger. However, the antitrust authorities have been hesitant to accept such 
behavioural commitments basically because of the monitoring obligations and the implementation of a 
reporting system post-merger.      
24  The availability of non-synergic efficiencies may be largest in cases of high pre-merger market power 
and therefore the greatest prospect of further increasing that power. However, intensive competition 
can be an obstacle in the realisation of particular types of efficiencies (see Farrell and Shapiro, 2001: 
709).  
25  See European Commission (2001) as well as de la Mano (2002) for an extensive discussion of the 
efficiency defense and the European system of merger control, as well as Copenhagen Economics 
(2006) for a discussion of practical methods to assess efficiency gains. 
26  As argued by Slade (2006: 23), merger-related efficiencies are often exaggerated, as most economies of 
scale and scope in manufacturing occur at plant level and economies in distribution are often tiny, as 
they typically do not represent a large fraction of total costs. However, Kolaski and Dick (2003: 245) 
identify three practical reasons why internal expansion can be more costly than a merger. First, firms can 
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Based on these general theoretical considerations and on practical experiences (see 
especially Everett and Ross, 2002, for an overview), three conditions for ‘acceptable’ 
merger efficiencies have been identified (see ICN, 2006: 64):   
1. Verifiability - Only those efficiencies will be taken into account which have a high 
probability of realisation within a reasonably short period after completion of the 
merger.27 
2. Benefit to consumers - Some share of the expected benefits of the merger efficiencies are 
likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. 28  Factually, this 
condition rules out a pure total welfare standard as appropriate for merger control.  
3. Merger specificity - The efficiency gains must be merger-specific, that is, they are unlikely to 
be produced or available absent the merger.  
Only efficiencies which satisfy all three conditions should be considered during (or 
alternatively following) the competitive assessment of a proposed horizontal merger. 
However, as reported by Scheffman (2004) for the United States, the practical role of 
efficiencies is more understood as a sort of ‘sliding scale’, in which the stronger the 
anticompetitive case, the less weight is given to efficiencies. In other words, there seems to 
be no weighting of the magnitude of efficiencies against the magnitude of anticompetitive 
effects as shown in the spreadsheet in Box 13 above.  
 
3.4 Consideration of the effects of the merger on other competition variables 
The fourth step of the detection framework has to consider the effects of the merger on 
competition variables other than price and quantity in order to allow an integrated 
assessment of the pro- or anticompetitiveness of a specific merger. The importance of such 
an assessment is expressed by several antitrust scholars, who argue that the traditional 
focus of antitrust analysis on the effects of a merger on market price is entirely static and 
too simple to understand the true economic motivations and effects behind a certain 
                                                                                                                                                                          
often expand their scale faster by a merger than by internal expansion. Second, adding new capacity in a 
market with constant or declining demand may also create pressures on price, which could make 
internal expansion unprofitable. Third, the construction of new capacity may create social waste in the 
form of first duplicating resources and later (probably) closing down capacity.     
27  As discussed in more detail in Davies et al. (2007: VIIIf.), the following types of evidence may be 
helpful in demonstrating efficiencies to the antitrust authority: detailed analysis of the extent and type of 
cost savings (e.g., on the basis of a business plan and supporting evidence that justifies the planning 
methods and shows the reasonableness of the applied assumptions), plant- and firm-level accounting 
statements, internal studies (using recent cost records and other pertinent objective data), strategic plans, 
data and analysis of past experience, statements of knowledgeable company personnel, bespoke research 
into customer preferences, market studies regarding future trends and innovation obstacles, 
management consulting studies or analysis prepared by antitrust-specialised economic consultants and 
merger simulation.    
28  Werden et al. (2005: 4ff.) identify three channels of how merger efficiencies can affect market prices 
post-merger (the so-called pass-though effect) in differentiated product markets. The most important 
channel is the direct effect of the reduction in a product’s marginal cost on its own price: “A reduction 
in the marginal cost of any of the merged firm’s products causes a reduction in its price by an amount 
largely determined by the curvature of that product’s demand curve. The other two ways in which 
marginal-cost reductions affect consumer prices relate to the nature of the competitive interaction 
among differentiated products. When a reduction in the marginal cost of one of the merged firm’s 
products causes a reduction in that product’s price, the price reduction causes a shift in the demand 
curves of the merged firm’s other competing products. Consequently, the merged firm adjusts the prices 
of all the competing products it sells in response to a reduction in marginal cost for any one of those 
products. In addition, non-merging sellers of competing products adjust their prices in response to the 
price changes of the merged firm” (Werden et al., 2005: 4).  
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merger.29 Following Scheffman (1996: 247), “[t]he standard industrial organisation analysis 
of a merger boils the merger down to potential shifts in static cost and demand curves and 
concentrates on the effects of the merger on short run pricing dynamics. This approach 
misses the essence of what business strategy, and mergers, in particular, are about.”  
Hofer and Williams (2005b) agree with the general argument, especially with respect to so-
called fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) markets (such as soft drinks, tobacco or 
mobile phones), in which the fundamental dimension of competition is not price but 
marketing and branding. A reduction in competition due to a merger in such industries 
could therefore take the form of lower levels of marketing expenditure rather than 
increases in price.30   
With respect to the role of innovation, Hofer and Williams (2005b) argue that many of 
the biggest gains to consumers in markets arise from innovation and dynamic aspects of 
market competition, “and if reductions in competition lead to reductions in innovation, the 
consequences for consumers can potentially be at least as serious than the effect of a five 
to ten percent increase in price” (Hofer and Williams (2005b: 7). In other words, the role of 
advertising in creating new demand and the role of R&D in creating new technological 
competition can be critical dimensions of competition and need to be considered as a 
compulsory part of any competition assessment.31 
With respect to the role of innovation in merger control, Katz and Shelanski (2006) 
recently presented an integrated approach of this multifaceted relationship by studying the 
implications of innovation in the complete merger control procedure consisting of market 
definition, analysis of competitive effects, consideration of efficiencies and remedies. The 
authors base their assessment on the separation of two effects which need to be considered 
as part of an extended merger control procedure: An innovation impact criterion - which takes 
account of the fact that innovation can affect the relationship between the pre-merger 
marketplace and the post-merger marketplace - and an innovation incentives criterion, which 
takes account of the fact that innovation itself can be an important dimension of market 
performance that could be affected by a merger. “To examine the innovation incentives 
effect, one asks how the change in market structure and competition brought about by a 
merger will likely affect consumer welfare through effects on the pace or nature of 
innovation that might reduce costs or that brings new products to market. To examine the 
innovation impact effect, the situation is reversed. It refers not to how market structure will 
affect innovation but to how innovation will affect the evolution of market structure and 
competition. Innovation is a force that could make static measures of market structure 
unreliable or irrelevant, and the effects of innovation may be highly relevant to whether a 
                                                          
29  On a more general level, characteristics of so-called new-economy industries need to be considered in 
competition policy assessments (see, for instance, OFT, 2002). Those characteristics include R&D and 
intellectual property, network effects, high fixed/sunk costs and low marginal costs, technical 
complexity, compatibility and standards.  
30  As noted by Hofer and Williams (2005b), such a reduction in marketing competition is difficult to 
evaluate from a welfare perspective, basically because economists haven’t come to final conclusions on 
the general role of marketing. While some argue that marketing is procompetitive and provides the 
consumers with relevant information on the respective products, others are of the opinion that 
marketing is just a mechanism for redistributing rents. “Accordingly, a reduction in marketing 
expenditures could simply be seen as an efficiency of a merger. However, to the extent that marketing 
expenditures expand market demand and consumer valuation, then a reduction in marketing 
expenditures could reduce consumer welfare” (Hofer and Williams, 2005b: 6). 
31  The increasing importance of innovation concerns in antitrust policy is underpinned by Gilbert (2007: 
2ff.). He analysed the mergers challenged by the US antitrust authorities in three periods: 1990 to 1994, 
1995 to 1999 and 2000 to 2003. In these periods the authorities challenged 135, 269 and 108, mergers 
respectively, of which 4, 47, and 41 respectively mentioned ‘innovation’ as a reason for the challenge. 
Expressed in percentages, the importance of innovation effects rose from about 3% in the first period 
to about 18% in the second period, up to 38% in the third period.  
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merger should be challenged and to the kind of remedy antitrust authorities choose to 
adopt” (Katz and Shelanski, 2006: 14).  
From a practical perspective, there are at least two ways in which innovation incentives 
have played a role in merger control. First, as part of a merger which involves actually 
existing product markets in which R&D is one important competition variable such as, for 
instance, the software industry. Second, alternatively, a merger can take place between 
companies who are both solely focusing on R&D and consequently do not sell any product 
on a product market at the time of the merger. In such a case, the question arises whether 
the traditional merger control procedure is applicable at all. Focusing on the first group of 
cases, Gilbert and Sunshine (1995: 595ff.) suggest the following five-step framework to 
study the effects of a merger on market power in an innovation market: 1.) Identify the 
overlapping R&D activities of the merging firms; 2.) Identify alternative sources of R&D; 
3.) Evaluate actual and potential competition from downstream products; 4.) Assess the 
increase in concentration in R&D and competitive effects on investment in R&D and 5.) 
Assess R&D efficiencies.  
In a nutshell, given the ex ante indefiniteness of an increase in concentration on the 
scope and pace of R&D, it is unlikely that R&D can be evaluated by the same instruments 
as the effects of mergers on price. The consideration of innovation markets necessarily has 
to be approached by some kind of rule–of-reason approach, such as the proposal by 
Gilbert and Sunshine. In any case such an assessment is affected by its forward-looking and 
hypothetical character. 
 
4  Conclusion 
An efficient antitrust policy with respect to horizontal mergers needs to consider a 
‘detection’ stage as well as an ‘intervention’ stage. However, compared to hard core cartel 
enforcement, the characteristics and requirements of both stages differ considerably. With 
respect to the ‘detection’ stage, the basic aim of merger control is typically not to detect the 
conduct ‘merger’ as such but rather to assess whether a notified merger would cause 
significant anticompetitive effects. As a consequence, while (ex-post) cartel enforcement (as 
well as most other areas of antitrust policy) is backwards oriented aiming at detecting and 
proving breaches of the cartel ban, merger control needs to look into the future and must 
develop a picture of the likely competitive effects in case the proposed merger would be 
allowed.    
With respect to the possible competitive effects, a horizontal merger inevitably leads to 
the loss of a direct competitor in the (relevant) market and is therefore suspicious of 
leading to price increases. From an economic perspective, there are basically two strands of 
argument which can both explain such a post-merger price increase potential. On the one 
hand, the merged entity ‘unilaterally’ might have incentives to decrease output and increase 
price given the increase in market power post-merger. On the other hand, post-merger 
prices may be higher than pre-merger prices because the remaining firms in the post-
merger market may find it easier to tacitly or overtly collude.  
In addition to the effect on price, horizontal mergers may influence welfare through 
several other channels such as product repositioning, product variety as well as incentives 
to innovate. As all these price- and non-price effects might contribute to the overall pro- or 
anticompetitiveness of a certain merger proposal, they are invariably reflected in the 
proposed four step approach which was designed to guide the analysis aiming at detecting 
anticompetitive mergers:  1. Estimation of the post-merger price increase; 2. Consideration 
of evidence whether such a price increase would be sustainable; 3. Estimation of the effect 
of possible merger efficiencies on the post-merger price; and 4. Consideration of the 
effects of the merger on competition variables other than price (such as product variety or 
the incentives to innovate)  
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In the first step of the framework, an estimate of the impact of a horizontal merger on 
the market price needs to be derived. A homogenous Cournot model as well as a 
differentiated Bertrand model is used to derive back-of-the-envelope formulas which can 
be applied to estimate the expected percentage price increase post-merger. Subsequent, the 
second step of the framework has to assess whether the price increase predicted on the 
first stage would be sustainable post-merger. As simulation tools typically need to abstract 
from important factors - such as entry or product repositioning of existing rivals - these 
factors typically have to be assessed qualitatively. The third step of the framework needs to 
assess, first, whether the merger efficiencies claimed by the merging parties are existent, 
merger-specific and are likely to materialize post-merger. Second, it needs to be estimated 
whether the accepted efficiencies are substantial enough to at least hold the pre-merger 
price level. As in the first step of the framework, the two standard oligopoly models are 
applied to derive back-of-the-envelope formulas for the percentage cost reduction 
sufficient to hold the pre-merger price level. Finally, the fourth step of the framework 
needs to consider the effects of a horizontal merger on other competition variables such as 
product variety, marketing as well as R&D post-merger which might influence the overall 
welfare effects of a merger. 
Given this proposal to detect anticompetitive mergers, future research will focus on the 
design of the complementary intervention stage which becomes relevant when the antitrust 
authority concludes its preliminary analysis on the detection stage with the finding that the 
anticompetitive effects of a merger dominate the procompetitive effects. However, in 
contrast to hard core cartel enforcement, it is not the aim of the intervention stage to 
sanction proposed anticompetitive mergers but to give the respective firms the possibility 
to resolve the identified competition problems in order to be allowed to proceed with their 
merger plans. As a consequence, from the viewpoint of the merging parties, merger 
remedies must have the potential to (‘just’) restore competition in the relevant market post-
merger, however, subject to the conditions that neither the merger-induced efficiencies nor 
already realised ‘pre-merger’ efficiencies are reduced or even destroyed by the respective 
remedies. From the viewpoint of the antitrust authority, the proposed merger remedies (as 
an intervention instrument) have to be effective in restoring competition in the relevant 
market post-merger. Only in cases where such remedies cannot be found (or agreed upon 
with the firms involved), the antitrust authority eventually has to ban the respective merger.  
 
 
5  Annex 
5.1 Price effects of mergers in a homogenous Cournot model 
Given the Lerner index of market power for the firm i, it is possible to derive an aggregate 
index of market power for an industry as a whole. If 
i
iiLsL we get 
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i
m
D
m
D
i HHIsL 
2
. (9)
Equation (9) basically shows that there is a direct relationship between industry 
concentration (HHI) and market power (L).  
In horizontal merger cases, an important question is how the price changes from P1 (pre-
merger) to P2 (post-merger) when the HHI changes from HHI1 (pre-merger) to HHI2 
(post-merger). Simply applying Equation (9) for the pre-merger as well as post-merger 
equilibrium leads to the following expressions (see Nelson and Sun, 2001: 953f.):   
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Calculating p1 and p2 as a function of HHI1 and HHI2 we get 
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If it is assumed that there are no cost savings due to the merger (i.e. c1=c2) we get 
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Furthermore, HHI2 can be expressed as follows   
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Therefore, the change in the HHI is given by    
2112 2 ssHHIHHIHHI  . (15)
 
and Equation (13) can be expressed in terms of market shares as follows  
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5.2 Price effects of mergers in a differentiated Bertrand model  
This section aims at deriving Equations (4) and (5) in the main text which can be used as a 
‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculation to get percentage post-merger price increase estimates. 
The derivation largely follows Shapiro (2004). In general, the following exercise compares 
the prices set for two products A and B (which are produced by separately owned firms) in 
a differentiated Bertrand duopoly with the profit-maximising prices for these two products 
if a single firm controls both products. 
For the case of a linear demand function, the demand curves can be written as q1=a-
pA+DpB and qB=a-pB+DpA. The profit of firm A is then given by 
  BAAAA Dppacp  . (17)
Deriving the first order condition with respect to pA and rearranging leads to the following 
best response function for firm A   
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Assuming cost symmetry the unique market price can be calculated to  
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The pre-merger price-cost margin is - as usually - given by 
p
cpm  . Substituting (19) and 
some manipulations lead to  
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The merged company would control both prices and would set p to maximise (p-c)(a-p+Dp) 
and would charge a post-merger (monopoly) price of 
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The percentage price increase is given by p/)pp( *  which is equal to 
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Several algebraic manipulations lead to 
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Substituting for m , Equation (23) can be written as  
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This is the equation used in the main text for a linear demand function. 
 
For a constant elasticity of demand, it is assumed that the elasticity falls from its pre-
merger level of ε to a post-merger level of ε(1-D). Applying the usual mark-up  1m , we 
get  
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p
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Furthermore, we can write 
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To receive reasonable results, inequality ε(1-D)>1 must hold. Using (25) this necessary 
condition can be written as  m1D  . In other words, the diversion ratio must not be too 
large - especially if the pre-merger margins are large - to receive economically sensible 
results. As explained in more detail by Shapiro (2004: 4) this is another proof that the 
assumption of constant elasticity of demand cannot hold up for large price increases and 
should consequently only be considered for relatively small price increases.  
Substituting the above equations, the percentage post-merger price increase is given by 
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Cancelling the c terms and multiplying it by ε(1-D) leads to 
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Rearranging, multiplying by (ε-1)(1-D) and collecting terms leads to  
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Combining these two terms leads to 
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Using Equation (26) above finally leads to 
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This is the equation for an iso-elastic demand function used in chapter 2. Equation (32) 
only provides economically sensible estimates for 0mD1   or m1D  . This is a relatively 
tight bound. Furthermore, a comparison of the percentage post-merger price increases 
show that even for the relatively small margin/diversion ratio values (in which the 
estimates with an iso-elastic demand curve are economically sensible), the percentage 
difference between both estimates are substantial. This is shown in Table 5 below. 
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Table 5. Difference in percentage price increases between iso-elastic and linear demand 
  Pre-merger price-cost margins 
  0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2 0,25 0,3 0,35 0,4 0,45 0,5 
 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
0,05 0,00 0,15 0,33 0,54 0,81 1,13 1,52 2,00 2,58 3,32 4,24 
0,1 0,00 0,31 0,69 1,17 1,75 2,46 3,33 4,42 5,78 7,50 9,72 
0,15 0,00 0,50 1,12 1,89 2,85 4,04 5,53 7,41 9,80 12,90 17,02
0,2 0,00 0,71 1,61 2,74 4,17 5,97 8,25 11,18 15,00 20,09 27,08
0,25 0,00 0,95 2,18 3,75 5,76 8,33 11,67 16,04 21,90 30,00 41,67
0,3 0,00 1,24 2,86 4,97 7,71 11,31 16,07 22,50 31,43 44,36 64,29
0,35 0,00 1,57 3,67 6,46 10,17 15,14 21,92 31,41 45,23 66,63 103,21
0,4 0,00 1,97 4,67 8,33 13,33 20,24 30,00 44,33 66,67 105,00 183,33
0,45 0,00 2,45 5,91 10,74 17,53 27,27 41,73 64,43 103,64 184,09 429,55
D
ive
rsi
on
 ra
tio
 
0,5 0,00 3,06 7,50 13,93 23,33 37,50 60,00 99,17 180,0 427,5 Div/0
Unit: % points 
As Table 5 shows, even for very small margins and diversion ratios the differences in the 
percentage price increase estimates between iso-elastic and linear demand functions are 
quite substantial. In other words, the choice of the correct type of demand function 
matters in the application of the equations derived above. 
5.3 Sufficient percentage cost reduction to prevent price increases in a homogenous 
product merger 
In a Cournot model with homogeneous goods, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) showed that 
without creating substantial synergies, a merger necessarily leads to a reduction in industry 
output and therefore total welfare. Although the non-merging firms typically react to a 
decrease in output of the merged firm with an increase in their output, the net effect on 
total welfare is negative. If, however, a merger in such a Cournot world reduces the 
marginal costs of the merging firms by a ‘sufficient amount’, the merging firms have an 
incentive to increase output post-merger, leading to lower prices and increases in total as 
well as consumer welfare. The derivation of this ‘sufficient amount’ (which just leaves 
consumer surplus unchanged compared to the pre-merger state) is presented below (see 
generally Froeb and Werden (1998) for the following).  
The derivation of the sufficient percentage cost reduction to prevent price increases in a 
homogenous product merger starts with the well-known first-order condition for profit 
maximisation in a Cournot model 
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with si being the output-based market share of firm i. This equation can be rearranged to 
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Denoting the merging firms with subscripts j and k, and substituting the sum of the shares 
of firms j and k for the merged firm’s share lead to the following expression for the merged 
firm’s marginal cost post-merger 
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The pre-merger (share-weighted) average marginal cost for the merged entity is then given 
by 
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The proportionate reduction in marginal cost necessary to restore the pre-merger price can 
then calculated to   
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In the symmetric case, where sj=sk=s, Equation (37) simplifies to  
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Following Froeb and Werden (1998: 269), substituting the geometric mean of the merging 
firm’s market shares,   21jiss , provides a good approximation of ‘s’ in Equation (38) above 
and allows the derivation of Table 3 presented in the main text above.  
5.4 Sufficient percentage cost reduction to prevent price increases in a differentiated 
products merger 
In a Bertrand model with differentiated goods, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) 
demonstrated that any merger (which generates no cost efficiencies) would lead to price 
increases for the products of the merging firms and would also incentivise the outsider 
firms in the market to increase prices for their products. Such a merger would therefore 
necessarily reduce consumer surplus. If, however, the merger generates sufficient marginal 
cost reductions for the merging firms, the post-merger equilibrium prices can even 
undercut the pre-merger equilibrium prices.     
To derive the sufficient percentage cost reduction to prevent price increases in a 
differentiated product merger, it is initially assumed that the merger leaves the market price 
unchanged, however, reduces marginal costs (see Werden, 1996: 410ff.) for the following). 
The proportionate reduction in marginal costs can be derived from the usual definition of 
the price-cost margin M for product i. If superscript ‘0’ represents pre-merger values and 
‘1’ post-merger values, that definition can be rearranged to 
0
01
0
10
1 i
ii
i
i
ii
M
MMc
c
cc

 . (39)
Equation (39) can, in turn, be used to derive an expression for the merger-induced cost 
reduction necessary to restore pre-merger prices. Under the assumption that each product 
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is initially sold by a single firm, the pre-merger first-order condition for profit maximisation 
are 
iiiM 10   (40)
and leads to the following condition in case of a two-firm merger that maximises the sum 
of the profits for the two respective products i and j 
iiijjiji ppDMM 1/11  . (41)
Equations (40) and (41) can than be solved for the post-merger margins in terms of the 
pre-merger margins and other quantities 
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Substituting Equations (40) and (42) into Equation (39) leads to the marginal cost 
reductions necessary to restore pre-merger prices 
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For the symmetric case, Equation (43) can be simplified to 
D
D
M
Mc  11 . (44)
This is the equation for the marginal cost reduction necessary to restore pre-merger prices 
applied in the main text above.   
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